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Purpose – This study links the strategic literature based supply chain resilience capabilities 
and operational/ practitioner based disaster management processes to build an integrated 
generic supply chain resilience framework. 
Design/ Methodology/ Approach – Utilising an in depth qualitative case of a collaborative 
agency in a well-developed country this paper explores their collaboration, communication, 
coordination and cooperation processes to better disaster management while building supply 
chain resilience.  
Findings – The empirical data lead to the creation of an integrated supply chain resilience 
framework identifying the interplay of disaster management processes and critical 
capabilities required to build supply chain resilience over the four different disaster 
management phases. The critical importance of mitigation processes in building supply chain 
resilience is highlighted. 
Practical Implications/ Social Implications – The proposed generic supply chain resilience 
framework represents an initial attempt to help management to direct resources and plan for 
building the capabilities required in each phase of disaster management, while remaining 
strategically focused. 
Originality – This paper contributes to an advanced understanding of supply chain resilience 
in both commercial and humanitarian aid organisations by developing an integrated 
framework, depicting four distinct phases, associated capabilities and processes. By utilising 
the unique disaster supply chain management context a two way knowledge and learning 
flow between humanitarian and commercial organisations is established.  
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Introduction 
The growing complexity of managing global supply chains and meeting exacerbating 
customer requirements has made organisations more aware of their operational and economic 
vulnerability to threats from the macro environment: every business activity has an inherent 
risk of unexpected disturbances which can lead to financial losses and in some cases firm 
closures (Skipper and Hanna, 2009). Building supply chain resilience can help to reduce and 
overcome exposure (vulnerability) to risks (Peck, 2005; Svensson, 2000; Tang, 2006; Wagner 
and Bode, 2006), through developing strategies which enable the supply chain to recover to 
its original (or an improved) functional state following a disruption (Jüttner and Maklan, 
2011). However, despite growing requirement for firms to develop pro-active and 
comprehensive risk management processes, such as building resilience, theory offers little 
help or guidance (Hale and Moberg, 2005).  
The academic supply chain management (SCM) literature fails to move beyond 
theory to offer management guidance on the implementation and operationalization of the 
supply chain resilience concept. There is limited empirical research on the topic to date, so 
the research picture is incomplete and lacks specific and important practitioner insights 
(Jüttner, 2005). In contrast, detailed practical guidance on how to manage disasters and 
inherent disruptions is provided by government agencies such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) in the US or the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
department of the European Commission (ECHO). This guidance is based on general, 
practitioner based disaster management processes and has developed independently of theory. 
The purpose of this research is to combine theory and practice to develop an integrated 
supply chain resilience framework by investigating the interdependencies between the 
theoretical frameworks of supply chain resilience and the operational practitioner based 
emergency management processes.  
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To, firstly, address this gap and, secondly, establish a greater understanding of how 
organisations can build supply chain resilience we consider an in depth qualitative case study 
in the disaster management context. There is a growing appreciation that unique contexts, 
often demonstrating extreme situations (Bamberger and Pratt, 2010), can provide critical 
insights that offer potent depictions of some of the target phenomenon’s characteristics (here 
supply chain resilience). In addition, ‘general’ supply chain operations can benefit from 
research into disaster SCM (Christopher and Tatham, 2011): the unique context can provide 
insights for non-routine problem solving and risk management practices (Day et al., 2012) 
that lead to refinements and/ or development of theoretical frameworks for commercial 
operations.  
This paper makes two key contributions: the first and major contribution is the 
development of a generic (for both commercial and disaster management context) integrated 
framework of supply chain resilience. Findings extend existing knowledge by identifying 
how different disruption phases link to theoretical supply chain capabilities and practitioner 
processes, highlighting that the integration of processes and capabilities for building supply 
chain resilience has to be iterative and staged. Secondly, we demonstrate the usefulness of 
our integrated framework and reveal its significant managerial implications through a 
retrospective analysis of aid operations in response to Hurricane Katrina. This analysis 
illustrates how mitigation processes are an integral part of building resilience antecedent to 
the ability of a supply chain to prepare for, respond to and recover from a disruption.  
The article is organised as follows. We begin by deriving the strategic dimension on 
supply chain resilience from academic literature, and practitioner generated disaster 
management processes to capture the current operational perspective, establishing the state of 
the art in both disciplines. We then present our case study design, followed by a summary of 
the research findings for discussion in respect to existing literature. Through an analysis of 
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Hurricane Katrina we will show the usefulness of our framework. Finally, we elaborate on 
implications for theory and management practices, present limitations and identify 
suggestions for future research. 
Literature Review 
Supply Chain Resilience - The Strategic Dimensions 
In today’s interconnected world most organisations recognise the potential risk of 
experiencing a supply chain disruption (Skipper and Hanna, 2009) e.g. caused by a workforce 
strike, extreme weather conditions or a truck breaking down (Blackhurst et al., 2011). Such 
disruption can be related to any unplanned and unanticipated event that impacts the normal 
flow of goods, material and/ or services (Craighead et al., 2007). The vulnerability of supply 
chains to disruptions is evidenced by major events in the past e.g. the earthquake in Japan in 
2012 not only impacted the Japanese and Asian economies, but led to shortages in the 
automobile and technology industry supply chains in Europe. 
The apparent ability of some supply chains to recover from inevitable and unexpected 
supply chain disruptions more effectively than others (see e.g. Nokia and Ericsson case) 
triggered a debate about supply chain resilience (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011). Supply chain 
resilience is based on the underlying assumption that not all risks can be prevented (Jüttner 
and Maklan 2011). Resilience is a pro-active and holistic approach to managing supply chain 
risks enhancing traditional risk management strategies (i.e. risk assessment, vulnerability 
analysis, continuity planning): as it does not require risk identification and quantification 
supply chain resilience can deal with unforeseeable disruptions and events (Pettit et al., 
2010). The concept refers to an organisation’s capacity to survive, adapt and grow when 
confronted with change and uncertainty (Knemeyer et al., 2009) and has been defined in 
supply chain terms as ‘the adaptive capability of the supply chain to prepare for unexpected 
events, respond to disruption and recover from them by maintaining continuity of operations 
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at the desired level of connectedness and control over structures and function’ (Ponomarov 
and Holcomb, 2009, p. 131, emphasis added). It can be thought of in terms of ‘shock 
absorption’ between stages of the supply chain (Sheffi and Rice, 2005).  
While there are few conceptual differences with regards to the definition of supply 
chain resilience in current literature (see e.g. Peck, 2005; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009; 
Sheffi and Rice, 2005), the formative elements needed to secure the adaptive capability of 
resilience are presented with significant disparity (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011). In this research 
we use the existing conceptualisation of a resilient supply chain from a system-level 
perspective as suggested by Christopher and Peck (2004). Their research identifies four 
primary capabilities for developing resilience: (1) supply chain (re-)engineering, (2) 
collaboration, (3) agility and (4) risk awareness. Additionally, after reviewing literature we 
consider knowledge management as a fifth system level element due to frequent references in 
literature to knowledge management practices (e.g. supply chain understanding (Blackhurst et 
al., 2011; Christopher and Peck, 2004)). Following we will explain the system-level approach 
in more detail incorporating other formative elements of resilience referred to in literature 
which we imply to be logical sub-categories of the five elements as per Table 1 in Appendix 
B.  
Supply Chain (Re-)engineering 
When a disruption happens, it is already too late to try to develop preventative solutions 
(Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Resilience must be built into a supply chain in 
advance of a disturbance and incorporate readiness to enable an efficient and effective 
response (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). Robust supply chain strategies enhance a firm’s 
capability to sustain its operations when a major disruption hits (Tang, 2006) by preventing 
risks from having negative effects and enabling resistance to change without adapting its 
initial stable configuration (Wieland and Wallenburg, 2012). This requires all chain members 
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to have an understanding of the network (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Ponis and Koronis, 
2012; Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009) to be aligned in the event of a disruption occurring 
(Jüttner and Maklan, 2011). Mapping the supply network involves understanding who owns 
what, and what are the key measures that are currently in place (Harland et al., 2003). Such 
maps can then direct management attention and enable the prioritization of planning (Sheffi 
and Rice, 2005) as processes and structures to absorb risks are already in place when the risk 
event occurs (Wieland and Wallenburg, 2012). This is especially relevant to balancing 
efficiency of operations (Pettit et al., 2010, 2013) with the need for redundant capacity  
(Sheffi and Rice, 2005; Sheffi, 2005) to provide a buffer that can buy time for a firm to 
recover from a disruption (Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010), for example safety stocks or multiple 
suppliers. Obtaining a holistic understanding of cost/ benefit trade-offs when managing risks 
and understanding where inventory should be strategically placed, in what form it should be 
held and how much is necessary enables an effective handling of disruptions and increases 
resilience (Blackhurst et al., 2011). This can only be achieved through collaboration between 
the different members of the supply chain.  
Collaboration 
As SCM is essentially a network theory the management of risk must also be examined from 
a network perspective (Christopher and Peck, 2004). Collaboration among organisations in a 
supply chain network is what integrates the network as a whole and makes a holistic 
approach, needed to build supply chain resilience, possible (Sheffi, 2001); there is a consent 
in literature that collaboration is an essential element of building supply chain resilience (see 
also Table 1). The fundamental principle of supply chain collaboration is that the exchange of 
information and application of shared knowledge across the chain can decrease uncertainty 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004), increase visibility (Faisal et al., 2006), operational 
effectiveness and efficiency, and enhance customer service.  
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Collaboration amongst supply chain members can be vertical or horizontal, and can 
either be an operational matter - emphasising how working together can support supply chain 
efficiency - or involve strategic knowledge or innovation perspectives, as ways for members 
to access complementary skills to improve chain performance (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011). 
While vertical collaboration involves different members at different value chain stages 
(suppliers, manufacturers, customers, etc.), horizontal collaboration takes place between 
different organisations working at the same level, usually in partnerships or between different 
functional departments within an organisation. Collaboration is not only important before and 
during a disruption but also after a disruption, in order to share experiences among the parties 
to increase the ability of the system to deal with future risks (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011; 
Sheffi, 2005).  
Agility 
Resilience implies agility, or the flexibility and ability to speedily adapt (also referred to as 
velocity) to both positive and negative environmental influences (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 
2009). The driver behind agility is the continuous search for the most appropriate response to 
change, uncertainty and unpredictability within the business environment (Lin et al., 2006). 
Flexibility facilitates coordination processes and enables organisations to cope with the high 
levels of environmental and operating uncertainty (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). However, to 
do so, visibility, the ability to see from one end of the supply chain to the other, is of 
paramount importance (Christopher and Peck, 2004; Jüttner and Maklan, 2011; Pettit et al., 
2013). Visibility ensures confidence in the supply chain preventing overreaction, unnecessary 
interventions and ineffective decision in a risk event situation (Christopher and Lee, 2004). 
Hence, in line with Christopher and Peck (2004) and Faisal et al. (2006) we capture visibility, 
velocity and flexibility as important building blocks and antecedents of agility, which are 
needed in a resilience supply chain. 
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Risk Awareness/ Knowledge Management 
While agility is necessary to be able to react to uncertainty, a resilient supply chain also 
demands a supportive management culture (Christopher and Peck, 2004) and direct top 
management support (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). As Sheffi and Rice (2005, p. 47) 
state “it is important not to underestimate the contribution of culture to an organisation’s 
flexibility and resilience”. To be resilient, organisations need to develop appropriate 
management policies and actions that assess risk continuously and coordinate the efforts of 
their supply network (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005): supply chain partners must share a 
common understandings and awareness of the risks that could occur within their operations 
(Faisal et al., 2006).  
The capacity to learn from past disruptions to develop better preparedness for future 
ones is a principal property of resilience (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). Therefore, 
leading companies provide training to employees, suppliers and customers about security and 
supply network risks to raise awareness and reinforce the importance of supply chain 
resilience (Blackhurst et al., 2011; Rice and Caniato, 2003). Furthermore, knowledge and 
understanding of supply chain structures - both physical and informational - are important 
elements of supply chain resilience (Choi and Hong, 2002).  
In summary, supply chain (re-)engineering, collaboration, agility, risk awareness and 
knowledge management capabilities underpin a supply network’s resilience. These formative 
resilience elements are based on integrating and coordinating resources which often span 
functional areas and thus become manifested in supply chain processes (Jüttner and Maklan, 
2011). However, it remains unclear which processes build resilience and how they are related 
to the supply chain resilience elements from literature. Therefore, we need to understand how 
the specific interplay of these capabilities can be operationalized and applied in practice 
simultaneously if we are to further our understanding of supply chain resilience, which is the 
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purpose of this paper. As it is often useful to take an extreme example for illustration 
(Bamberger and Pratt, 2010) the context and empirical case study for this research is the 
disaster management sector. This sector offers extremely potent depictions of processes that 
deal with risk as frequent breakdowns and interruptions in the material and information flow 
occur (Blecken, 2010). Therefore, we now look to best practices within disaster management 
for insights on the operationalization of supply chain resilience. 
Disaster Management - Best Practices from an Extreme Context 
The disaster management context represents an ideal opportunity for examining supply chain 
resilience given the exacerbating frequency, magnitude and impact of disasters threatening 
the sustainability of communities, businesses and their resources around the globe. While it is 
still difficult to forecast exactly when or where a low probability-high impact disaster, such 
as an earthquake or tsunami, is going to happen, identifying vulnerable areas that are at risk 
(Peck, 2005; 2006) makes it possible to put in place practices and resources to minimise the 
potential impact of disasters before they occur i.e. to build resilience. Disaster management 
addresses the organisation and management of resources and responsibilities for humanitarian 
aspects of emergencies to lessen the impact of disasters (The International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2013). In this context SCM underpins 80% of all activities 
contributing to cost savings as well as to increased operational efficiency in the planning, 
delivery and distribution of relief goods (Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
Disaster SCM characteristics 
While ‘general’ SCM is characterised by a predetermined set of suppliers, manufacturing 
sites and stable or at least more predictable demand, disaster SCM is represented by large 
scale operations, irregular demand, unusual constraints in major emergencies and unreliable, 
or non-existent supply and transportation information – primarily unforeseeable factors 
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(Kovács and Spens, 2007). Under these circumstances the engineering of a distribution 
network is challenging due to the nature of the unknown (locations, type, spread and 
magnitude of events, politics and culture) (Beamon, 2004; Holguín-Veras et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, disaster management organisations deal with (almost) zero lead time in their 
supply chain as there may be no advance warning of a crisis, which in turn affects inventory 
availability, procurement and distribution. This places a huge emphasize on the agile 
capabilities in their supply chain. Moreover, as no single actor has sufficient resources to 
respond effectively independently, (Balcik et al., 2010) collaboration in the disaster 
management sector is of paramount importance. The regular breakdowns and interruptions in 
the material and information flow (Blecken, 2010) during disaster management operations 
allow us to conclude that organisations active in disaster management have a high risk 
awareness and can be considered experts (knowledgeable) in working with uncertainty and 
risk - for them experiencing unpredictability in SCM is the norm. Therefore, exploring 
processes employed during disaster management holds great potential for general insights on 
building resilient supply chains.  
Disaster Management Processes 
Similarly to how supply chain resilience is defined, resilience in the disaster management 
sector refers to the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region 
to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as drought, violence, 
conflict or natural disaster (European Comission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, 
2012). However, in contrast to the high level strategic perspective of supply chain resilience 
in the academic literature, there is a large body of applied and more operationally focused 
research in practitioner and trade journals as well as reports by government funded agencies. 
Based on a comprehensive analysis of these papers, Helferich and Cook (2002) identified 
pro-active and re-active disaster management processes for the supply chain context (see 
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Figure 1). While traditionally disaster management tends to be re-active and disaster specific 
this four phase disaster management framework advocates long term strategic planning for 
effective and efficient disaster management. Widely accepted in the humanitarian SCM 
context (see e.g. Kovács and Spens, 2007; Natarajarathinam et al., 2009; Pettit and Beresford, 
2005) the framework brings together the pro-active elements of mitigation and preparedness 
with the re-active elements of immediate response and recovery. Pro-active measures prepare 
for disruption response to contain and control potential risks (Tummala and Schoenherr, 
2011). More specifically, while mitigation is the application of measures that will either 
prevent the onset of a disaster or reduce the impact should one occur, preparedness includes 
activities that prepare for an effective and efficient response (Altay and Green, 2006; Tomlin, 
2006). Particularly, disaster risk reduction measures compromising preparedness, mitigation 
and prevention, aim to enhance resilience to disasters making use of information and 
communicate on technology and earth observation tools (The Montpellier Pane, 2012). 
Opposed to that are re-active processes that take place after a disruption has occurred 
including the employment of resources to preserve life, property, the environment, and the 
social, economic, and political structures (response) as well as actions taken in the long term 
after the immediate impact has passed to stabilize and restore some semblance of normalcy in 
structures (recovery) (Altay and Green, 2006). As displayed in Figure 1 these four phases are 
cyclical rather than linear and can operate concurrently: mitigation and reconstruction efforts 
often and ideally take place at the same time in parallel (Maon et al., 2009).1  
                                                          
1
 We would like to refer the reader to Maon et al. (2009) for an extensive list of SCM practices within the 
disaster management sector in each phase. 
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Figure 1 Disaster Management Processes  
(Adapted from Helferich and Cook (2002, p.53)) 
 
Figure 1 captures how the essence of effective and efficient disaster management is 
the application of a long term perspective to the processes of making pro-active decisions to 
lessen the impact of unforeseeable events combined with re-active decisions to overcome the 
impact (Natarajarathinam et al., 2009) analogous to definitions of resilience in academic 
research. In line with Ponomoarov and Holcomb (2009), who recognise resilience as an 
emerging field within emergency management research, we propose that these four disaster 
phases are directly related to resilience. We therefore expect supply chain resilience 
capabilities and disaster management processes/ phases to also be interrelated. To explore the 
specific relationships and interdependencies between the theoretical frameworks of supply 
chain resilience and the operational practitioner based emergency management we undertook 
Preparedness
•Establish a planning team
•Analyse capabilities and hazards
•Develop the plan
•Implement the plan
Immediate Response
•Implement response plan
•Evaluate direction and control
•Evaluate communications
•Evaluate life safety
•Evaluate poperty protection
•Evaluate public services
•Evaluate community outreach
Recovery
•Review and implement recovery plans
•Ensure continuity of management
•Maintain employee support
•Resume operations
Mitigation
•Define mitigation opportunities
•Develop mitigation plan
•Initiate development
•Continuous improvement plans
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a detailed qualitative case study in the disaster management sector. 
Methodology 
To empirically investigate the relationship between the disaster management processes and 
supply chain resilience capabilities we adopted an explanatory single case study design 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). Case study research is particularly suited 
to developing a holistic and in-depth understanding of a complex, unique and exploratory 
phenomena in a real-life context (Yin, 2009) while allowing questions of why, what and how 
to be answered (Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). Our study analyses the Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) group in El Paso, Texas and its disaster 
management processes across the four disaster phases in relation to the supply chain 
resilience framework outlined in the literature review. 
Introducing the Case 
VOAD provides a particularly appropriate research site as it was founded specifically to 
improve disaster management operations following inadequate preparation for Hurricane 
Camille in 1970. It is a national organisation (with 50 members) which coordinates efforts 
among organisations at both national (US) and State/Territory levels. The organisations 
involved have the stated aims of reducing potential suffering by increasing supply chain 
resilience through their commitment to communication, collaboration, cooperation and 
coordination. They share knowledge and resources to better serve those impacted by each 
disaster phase, so the organisation offers an excellent setting in which to examine how 
disaster management processes can be linked to supply chain resilience. Our in-depth study 
was based on the local VOAD group in El Paso, Texas, which was originally formed to 
incorporate 25 local organisations after unprecedented levels of rainfall in late July/early 
August 2006 damaged at least 1500 homes and 100 roadways, at a cost of approximately US 
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$200 million (Crowder, 2006).  
When the disaster occurred, local aid agencies were under enormous pressure to respond. 
Damage and recovery across the county were uneven (Collins, 2010), as there was no 
engineered system via which the different government, private and not-for profit sector 
agencies could coordinate their services or identify resources they needed (from other 
agencies) to improve their responsiveness. Most community agencies and groups knew very 
little about how to respond to a disaster, or how to collaborate to meet urgent client needs. 
This resulted in some neighbourhoods receiving a great amount of public and private 
attention, while other communities struggled with little support; unnecessary duplication of 
efforts meant some needs gained adequate attention while others went unmet. This is not a 
new phenomenon, and has happened on larger scales with devastating impact in ill-prepared 
disaster zones such as the Indian ocean Tsunami 2004 and the Darfur crises 2004/2005 (Jahre 
and Jensen, 2010).  
While conscious that examining a single organisation limits the transferability of 
findings, a single case study can offer convincing results, especially when the situation is 
deliberately selected to provide certain insights that alternative cases may not reveal 
(Siggelkow, 2007). Our chosen setting is of particular value as its supply chain network had 
been formed relatively recently and there was plenty of information available about its 
evolution and how its resilience capabilities and disaster management processes had been 
established and developed. In addition, the geographically remote location of the chain in the 
far South West of the country places more emphasis on its ability to prepare for and respond 
to any disaster independently, highlighting the importance of supply chain linkages.  
Data Collection 
To achieve internal triangulation (Voss et al., 2002), we used a range of techniques to collect 
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data: (1) nine interviews in three different VOAD lead member organisations, (2) observation 
of a 60 min VOAD meeting attended by 15 members, and (3) study of archival sources such 
as internal reports, memos and strategy documents.  
We organised individual semi-structured interviews (of approximately 45 minutes) 
from multiple viewpoints within the VOAD group (3 directors, 4 functional managers and 2 
volunteers) contributing to the richness and variety of the data collected (Alvarez et al., 
2010). All interviews took place face to face in the office buildings of the interviewees in 
July 2011, and were recorded and transcribed verbatim; as was the VOAD group meeting. 
Based on the initial literature review, an interview protocol was developed providing the 
structure for the data collection process. Accordingly, the interviews with participants 
followed a standard core (to facilitate data comparison – see Appendix A) organised under 
broadly defined themes, with open-ended questions and probes to encourage detailed 
responses to uncover material on specific aspects directly relating to disaster events and the 
VOAD group, as well as a range of general issues relating to the interviewee’s organisation: 
the group’s history and size, and descriptions of the specific roles of each supply chain 
partner’s manager. We asked respondents to recall examples of disasters that happened in 
their region, to describe their organisation’s role and the extent of their involvement, and to 
evaluate the effectiveness of their actions. The interviews were followed by informal 
discussions with participants which provided additional context for our analysis, but further 
background information about interviewees has been excluded from this paper as anonymity 
was a condition of their involvement. The VOAD meeting gave us additional data on how the 
pro-active dimensions of preparedness and mitigation are operationalized and how these 
could fit into the supply chain resilience framework.  
In a last step we reviewed archival sources, such as internal reports, strategy 
documents and newspaper reports. This allowed for triangulation as well as supplementation 
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to the background of the information collected through the interviews. Table 2 lists the titles 
and types of documents included in the research. 
Table 2 Types of documents analysed  
Document Name Type of Document Year 
1 Emergency Management Guide for Businesses and Industry Report  1993 
2 Emergency Response in the Community Report  2003 
3 Grant Narrative Application 2006 
4 Executive Summary Report  2008 
5 Empowerment Evaluation Matrix Report  2008 
6 Annual Report of Specific Project Report  2009 
7 Texas VOAD – Active Members and Services Provided Report  2010 
8 Disaster Preparedness Plan Strategic Document 2011 
9 Long Term Recovery Guide Report  2012 
 
Data Analysis 
In analysing the data we firstly applied a data reduction approach coding data items ranging 
in length from a few words up to several paragraphs, using in vivo codes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) to filter out data truly applicable to the disaster management context (first 
order codes). In doing so, we were very careful to only code situations influencing the 
disaster processes based on specific actions and interactions rather than beliefs of the 
respondents (see quotations in Table 3 and 4, Appendix B for representative examples of first 
order codes). To increase the reliability of our data, where necessary, we followed up with e-
mails and calls to fill in missing details e.g. if the length of a project was unclear or the scope 
of collaboration between different organisations. Following, the data analysis progressed 
through multiple phases. First we examined first order codes in relation to the disaster 
management processes. We deducted second order categories guided by Helferich and 
Cook’s (2002) disaster management framework (Figure 1) (see Table 3 in Appendix B for 
representative data). Next, we examined first order codes in relation to Christopher and 
Peck’s (2004) framework deducting second order categories under the headings of supply 
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chain (re-)engineering, collaboration, agility, risk awareness and knowledge management 
(see Table 4 in Appendix B for representative data). In doing so, we incorporated data in 
relation to the different resilience aspects that we grouped under the system level headings as 
per Table 1. In a third step, as our primary objective was to close the gap between theory and 
practice by establishing an integrated approach to supply chain resilience, we sought out and 
analysed patterns juxtaposing the data from Table 3 (disaster management processes) and 
Table 4 (supply chain resilience capabilities). This allowed us to generate Table 5 displaying 
the congruence between disaster management processes and supply chain resilience 
capabilities (illustrated via check marks). Where we only found partial confirmation for 
congruence i.e. only one or two informants’ codes in a category we refer to ‘possibly 
required’ processes/ capabilities (illustrated via check marks in brackets).  
Our initial understanding of the data (comparing pre-VOAD examples with post- VOAD 
examples of interviewees) pointed to a more complex relationship between supply chain 
capabilities and disaster management processes than anticipated. Therefore, to achieve a 
more in-depth exploration of the relationship between the two constructs we searched for 
patterns between disaster management processes, supply chain resilience capabilities and the 
four disaster phases. The triangulation of the interview data with archival data and literature 
brought us to the conclusion that a high emphasis on mitigation processes is essential to 
building supply chain resilience capabilities. In turn, preparedness, response and recovery 
processes cannot take place without having established supply chain resilience capabilities. 
This finding led to the re-coding of some of the disaster management processes differently to 
Helferich and Cook (2002), specifically in relation to preparedness and mitigation (compare 
Figure 1 with Table 5). 
NVivo9 was used to manage the data analysis process in a systematic and consistent 
manner (Alvarez et al., 2010). Although the data was coded manually, the software was 
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especially useful for fragmenting, re-assembling and re-coding the data so as to generate 
findings progressively. Overall, we followed a recursive iterative process to relate our data 
and findings to existing theoretical frameworks and literature (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007); an overview of the methodological process can be seen in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2 Methodological Process 
 
Overall, multiple measures were employed to ensure the trustworthiness of the 
qualitative data and their analysis: multiple iterations of data analysis, constant moving 
between data and theory and confirming the validity of preliminary analyses with respondents 
to identify and correct any misunderstandings or omissions (Voss et al., 2002). Similar to 
Jüttner and Maklan (2011) our aim is to generalise to the theoretical concepts and not to 
populations or universes, therefore our emphasis is on analytical generalisation rather than 
statistical generalisation.  
Findings and Discussion 
Applying the insights from our analysis enabled us to build an integrated supply chain 
resilience framework depicting the relationship between specific processes and capabilities 
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needed in the different disruption phases. Findings are presented by showing how VOAD 
builds resilience with the help of the theoretical supply chain capabilities and application of 
specific disaster management processes (summarised in Table 5). While we discuss each 
disaster phase separately for ease of reference, in reality these phases are linked and overlap 
naturally (Van Wassenhove and Pedraza Martinez, 2012).  
Mitigation Phase 
The ability of different organisations or internal business departments to work together to 
develop a collective strategy often determines the success or failure of managing a disaster 
and/ or supply chain disruption (Chandes and Paché, 2010). Therefore, a planning team with 
“effective leadership” acting as “a resource centre and communication hub” (Document 8) 
is critical to be able to start building a resilient supply chain and lessen the possible impact of 
disasters/ supply chain disruptions. This first step is essential and requires top management 
support and risk awareness throughout the supply network (including beneficiaries), without 
which all of the following processes in the different disaster phases for building a resilient 
supply chain cannot take place.  
As formative resilience capabilities are based on integrating and coordinating 
resources which often span functional areas (Jüttner and Maklan, 2010), this team needs to be 
made up from intra- and inter-organizational supply chain members. The analysis of data 
suggests that members of such a team should be deliberately chosen to make use of 
complementary capabilities while being “geared towards filling individual agencies resource 
gaps” (Director 2). Thus for the set-up of a resilient supply chain, strong strategic horizontal 
and vertical collaboration as well as knowledge management (transfer, store, create and 
apply) capabilities throughout the mitigation phase have to be built between all team/ supply 
chain members. 
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To ensure the most current evaluation of existing supply chain (resilience) 
capabilities, resources and possible hazards, routine meetings and reviews among the 
planning team are essential, as is the case in VOAD El Paso. Demand satisfaction, alternative 
sources of supplies (supplier and supplier’s supplier’s) as well as inventory and capacity 
levels in the supply chain have to be known prior to an event to prevent further complications 
during a disaster/ disruption that could have been avoided, both in terms of aid delivery as 
well as products/ services to consumers; as literature suggest (see e.g. Christopher and Peck, 
2004), supply chain resilience is a network theory and necessitates an according approach. 
Furthermore, our data indicates that such an analysis coupled with considerations of different 
scenarios can be the basis for the development of strategic plans for implementation during 
preparedness, immediate response and recovery along with measurements and metrics, that 
will need to be evaluated throughout all phases. Examples of measurements and metrics are 
monitoring of level of threats, pre-identification and pre-categorization of vulnerabilities, 
prioritization and sequencing plans (Oloruntoba, 2010). Such information has to be shared 
throughout the supply network so that every employee of every organization involved is 
familiar with the plans and what to expect once plans kick into action (van Vactor, 2011). 
While the above mentioned processes support the engineering of the necessary 
communication, collaboration, coordination and cooperation structure and infrastructure 
among the planning team, our findings show that they also help to identify, avoid and 
eliminate supply network inefficiencies prior to an event taking place. An example of such 
continuous improvements is the establishment of an updated preparedness plan (Document 8, 
discussed and evaluated during the observation of the VOAD meeting).  
It can be concluded that mitigation processes incorporating continuous improvement 
build the strategic capabilities of horizontal and vertical collaboration, risk awareness, supply 
chain (re-)engineering and knowledge management capabilities as suggested by the supply 
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chain literature, which form the basis for all other phases and an overall resilient supply 
chain. 
Preparedness Phase 
A prepared supply chain is ready to enable an efficient and effective response (Ponomarov 
and Holcomb, 2009) in line with the definition of supply chain resilience. Our data analysis 
suggests that during the preparedness phase strategic horizontal and vertical collaborative 
agreements set out in the mitigation phase are translated into operational plans. During that 
process all involved parties get ready for action; in case of an emergency they then know 
about their specific roles and can respond effectively to the disruption (Natarajarathinam et 
al., 2009). “We always have to make sure we are prepared for anything” (Functional 
Manager 2). Our findings indicate that routines established through learning exercises and 
simulations as well as the evaluation of pre-agreed metrics are critical components of the 
preparedness processes as they identify supply chain links and the institutional roles required 
to build resilience. Due to the rarity of actual opportunities for managers to acquire 
emergency experience literature suggests the inclusions of stress risk management and/ or 
assessment centres (Paton and Jackson, 2002; Paton, 2003). These simulate disaster scenarios 
and develop critical decision making as well as necessary collaboration capabilities (Hale and 
Moberg, 2005). A table top exercise during the observed VOAD meeting illustrated one 
example of such learning. 
Furthermore, our data analysis indicates that implementing and executing 
preparedness plans might also require agile supply chain capabilities: ”We had to set up in a 
matter of hours to expect what we thought might be 5-7000 people.” (Director 2). While 
some events happen out of the blue e.g. a fire in a plant, other events such as weather 
conditions are unavoidable, yet somewhat foreseeable and give more time to put the 
preparedness plan into action. To be able to do so, findings indicate that the preparedness 
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plan should outline each member’s specific role in a disaster/ supply chain disruption and 
their resources as well as network activities and includes the “set up of supplies in strategic 
locations” and “memorandums of understanding for supplies with other businesses […] to 
activate more resources” (Director 1).  
In conclusion, our findings suggest that the emphasis for building supply chain 
resilience through preparedness should be on the planning processes enabled by the strategic 
capabilities of knowledge management, collaboration and agility, rather than on the plan 
itself. Therefore, constant information exchange and learning from horizontal and vertical 
supply chain partners to “keep skill levels up” (Functional Manager 1), so as to be prepared, 
are essential. 
Immediate Response Phase 
Our analysis shows that high levels of horizontal and vertical collaboration capabilities are 
required when implementing the developed disaster plan, evaluating its direction and control, 
and ensuring communication. Pre-established lines of communication and knowledge of 
different expertise within the collaborative network enable e.g. the evaluation of life safety, 
property protection, public services and supply chain disruption outreach in a standardised 
and unified way. This is in line with previous research by Blackhurst et al. (2011) identifying 
communication protocols as a critical enabler for supply chain resilience. Furthermore, it 
appears that services and resources (human, physical and organisational) through vertical 
collaboration, upstream and downstream, can be incorporated better as network wide gaps are 
known immediately. 
While having direction and control as well as a permanent communication 
infrastructure for action during disasters is important, our data indicates that the adaptability 
and agility of the network structure to different situations and needs, that might occur during 
any emergency, is equally as essential: “there is no routine, every disaster is different” 
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(Functional Manager 1). It can be assumed that gaps in work flow and interruptions will 
occur during the immediate response (van Vactor, 2011) possibly necessitating re-
engineering of the supply chain. Therefore, organizations need to be able to adapt to changing 
needs, whether it is due to one of its members (or their resources) being affected (such as a 
local warehouse being destroyed) or other unforeseen circumstances.  
Overall our findings lead to the conclusion that horizontal and vertical collaboration 
and possible re-engineering capabilities during an emergency enable processes that help to 
get aid to people/ products to consumers effectively and efficiently while avoiding 
duplications of efforts. Furthermore, flexibility and agility are key capabilities for building 
supply chain resilience in the immediate response phase.  
Recovery Phase 
The implementation of pre-established recovery plans for crisis management begins the 
minute an emergency occurs (van Vactor, 2011). Consequently the planning team has to 
ensure the continuity of risk and resilience management while maintaining employee support 
to be able resume operations at the desired level, which possible involves re-engineering the 
supply chain. Analysis of findings show that this is only possible if risk awareness is spread 
throughout the supply chain. Additionally, horizontal and vertical collaboration capabilities 
help to use resources and complementary skills in the supply chain in the most effective and 
efficient way. Our data indicates that to do so all supply chain members need to have access 
to information and knowledge about the resources held by the different organizations: “We 
have lists of resources that we could provide for them. So we send out referrals for them. 
These are three different companies that are actually handing out what they need (Functional 
Manager 3).”  
We conclude that horizontal and vertical collaborative capabilities in the recovery phase of a 
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disruption help to establish processes enabling a network where resources and 
complementary skills can be used in the most effective and efficient way. Furthermore, risk 
awareness and knowledge management capabilities throughout the supply chain are needed 
to be able to achieve recovery while re-engineering nodes along the chain and maintaining 
continuity of operations at the desired level of connectedness and control over structures and 
function in line with the definition of supply chain resilience.  
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Table 5 Integrative Framework for Building Supply Chain Resilience 
Phase/  
Process (2nd Order Categories) 
Supply Chain Resilience Capabilities (2nd Order Categories) 
Horizontal & 
Vertical 
Collaboration 
Supply Chain  
(Re-) 
engineering 
Agility Risk 
Awareness 
Knowledge 
Management  
M
iti
ga
tio
n
 
Establish a cross-functional 
planning team √ √  √ √ 
Analyse supply chain 
capabilities and hazards √   √ √ 
Develop and communicate 
plan for preparedness, 
response and recovery 
√ √  √ √ 
Agree measurements and 
metrics for preparedness, 
response and recovery 
√ √  √ √ 
Develop continuous 
improvement and supply chain 
risk mitigation plans 
√ (√)  √ √ 
Pr
ep
a
re
dn
es
s 
Implement preparedness plan: 
Translate strategic agreements 
into operational matters 
√ (√) (√)  √ 
Evaluate based on 
measurements and metrics √  (√)  √ 
Establish routines through 
training and simulation √ √ (√)  √ 
R
es
po
n
se
 
Implement response plan, 
measurements and metrics  √ (√) √  √ 
Evaluate direction and control √  (√)  (√) 
Evaluate communications 
throughout the supply chain √  (√)  (√) 
Evaluate supply chain 
disruption outreach √ (√) √  (√) 
R
ec
o
v
er
y 
Review and implement 
recovery plans √ (√)   √ 
Ensure continuity of risk and 
resilience management √   √  
Maintain employee support √   √  
Resume operations √  (√)  √ 
 (√) = 
√ = 
possibly required  
required 
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An illustrative case of the integrated framework 
We now undertake a retrospective analysis of Hurricane Katrina to illustrate the analytical 
usefulness of our proposed integrative framework. Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans on the 
morning of August 29th 2005. One of the most destructive natural disaster to occur in the 
United States, it caused the death of circa 1,330 people and displaced over 770,000, destroyed 
an estimated 300,000 homes with over $96 billion in property damage, and left 118 million 
cubic yards of debris (Samaan and Verneuil, 2009). The disaster management for Katrina has 
been heavily criticised, mainly for the ineffective logistical response (Holguin-Veras et al., 
2007).  
At the time of the hurricane striking, disaster plans for New Orleans were still under 
development and inconsistent (Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
2006). The hurricane protection system had never been quantified, so the actual risk and 
vulnerability of the city was unknown (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2007). Therefore, 
the plans that were in place could not realistically judge the requirements and consequences 
of such an event (Holguin-Veras et al., 2007). Furthermore, no single agency was in charge of 
hurricane protection in New Orleans, there was no cross-functional planning team in place, 
and FEMA was not ready for the magnitude of the disaster (Qamar et al., 2007). While the 
destructive strength of the hurricane is undeniable officials preparing for the disaster were 
fully aware of critical deficiencies in their plans and gaping holes in their resources 
(Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006): it was known that 
FEMA lacked 20% of its workforce (Holguin-Veras et al., 2007) and that its logistics system 
suffered from significant and long-standing problems (Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, 2006). Processes to develop continuous improvement and supply 
chain risk mitigation plans to address these identified gaps were not in place.  
These examples show that the mitigation processes identified in our framework were 
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absent or problematic regarding the operations of Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, important 
and necessary supply chain resilience capabilities were not built pro-actively. This adversely 
impacted horizontal and vertical collaboration, supply chain (re-)engineering, agility, risk 
awareness as well as knowledge management and learning throughout the other phases of the 
disaster. In line with our findings this highlights that the necessary supply chain resilience 
capabilities must be built during the mitigation phase to enable the essential processes during 
preparedness, response and recovery that allow for effective and efficient disaster 
management. Table 6 in the Appendices shows a more detailed analysis of Hurricane Katrina 
in relation to the developed framework, identifying which specific interplay of capabilities 
and processes was adequate, problematic or non-existent. 2  
Conclusions 
In today’s interconnected globalised world supply chain resilience is of increasing relevance 
as it enables an organisation to prepare for, respond to and recover successfully from 
disruptions. Yet our review of the literature indicates that while theory has identified the 
capabilities required to achieve supply chain resilience, it fails to provide guidance on how 
these capabilities apply within the different phases entailed in the supply chain resilience 
definition. Our detailed qualitative investigation of the practices of a sophisticated disaster 
management supply chain enables the major contribution of this paper, the development of an 
integrative framework for building supply chain resilience, as depicted in Table 5. This 
framework extends current theory as it bridges the gap between theory and practice. 
Furthermore, our findings highlight that the integration of processes and capabilities for 
building supply chain resilience has to be iterative and staged; creating and maintaining 
resilience is not a one-time event, but rather a process in itself (Pettit et al., 2013). 
                                                          
2
 For details on a contrasting well executed disaster management we would like to refer the reader to Oloruntoba 
(2010) who describes the response to Cyclone Larry in 2006. 
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Supply chain resilience is considered a pro-active risk management strategy, however, 
the concept also captures the re-active elements of being able to respond to a disruption and 
recover to the same or an improved state of functioning (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011). While 
Helferich and Cooks’ (2002) framework places equal importance on the different phases of 
disaster management we show that the adaptive capability to prepare for, respond to and 
recover from disruption (definition of resilience) is foremost about mitigation processes. Our 
findings highlight that mitigation processes are of paramount importance as they are the 
antecedents to building supply chain resilience capabilities which in turn enable the execution 
of the necessary processes during preparedness, response and recovery. This important link 
has been missing to date, but is critical if we are to build relevant theory which advises 
organisations on the appropriate application and deployment of resources to build supply 
chain resilience. 
While there is no one size fits all model for supply chain resilience - each 
organization will have idiosyncratic requirements (van Vactor, 2001) in terms of time, 
human, physical and organisational resources– our framework contributes to the development 
of an awareness of the value of the strategic capabilities involved in the different disruption 
phases and of how they interact with each other through specific processes. Determining the 
appropriate practices to manage supply chain vulnerabilities and risk appears to be context 
specific, dependent amongst other things on the supply chain’s response to the need for 
operational excellence (Peck et al., 2003). Therefore, our integrated framework is not to be 
seen as a specific set out route to supply chain resilience but more as a road map that can 
guide individual, context specific supply chains (commercial and disaster management 
businesses) in improving and building up their supply chain resilience and disruption 
management capabilities.  
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Managerial Implications 
Our study’s findings also translate into several important practice implications for supply 
chain managers. Many aid agencies specialise in disaster management, so it can be taken as a 
given that one of their great strengths is that they know what to do in emergencies; hence, 
there is great potential for commercial businesses to learn from their practices. By analysing 
the collaboration efforts of the El Paso VOAD group to develop an integrated supply chain 
resilience framework our study explores how to support managers in implementing strategies 
to build supply chain resilience. In particular, the need for management to be pro-active in 
developing resilience is clearly demonstrated: mitigation processes are essential to building 
supply chain resilience, irrespective of the type of organisation. Setting up networks and 
infrastructures in advance creates knowledge and resilience capabilities prior to the event that 
can reduce the vulnerability of the supply chain. By moving from a high level theoretical 
awareness of the need for resilience to building awareness of specific mitigation processes 
that develop the adaptive capabilities to prepare for, respond to and recover from a 
disruption/ disaster allows management to direct and prioritise resources accordingly while 
reducing the vulnerability of the supply chain for unforeseeable events.  
The subtleties in collaboration which we have identified have significant implications 
for how supply network members communicate at different stages of disaster management 
(see processes during mitigation, preparedness, immediate response and recovery), 
reinforcing the need for managers to be aware of the importance of cross-functional teams. 
Fostering continuous commitment to communication and collaboration at different levels of 
management within and between organizations, involving staff from different departments, 
supply chain members and organisational levels in strategic planning and establishing risk 
awareness via training and education is the first step to becoming more resilient.  
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Limitations and Research Implications 
This paper identifies the connection between disaster management processes and strategic 
capabilities needed at each phase as a disaster/ disruption strikes to achieve a resilient supply 
network. Our proposed integrated framework combines key concepts from disaster 
management and supply chain resilience to develop an integrated view that shows the 
interdependencies between disruption phases, capabilities and processes that can be 
synchronized via a strategic and synchronized approach. 
While this paper reports the findings for research into just one VOAD group in the 
United States it is based on a central US government initiative supported by a pool of 
available information. Therefore, we believe other VOAD groups operate on a similar basis. 
However, as interviewees could choose which disaster example to talk about there may be 
some concerns in relation to the reliability of what participants recalled depending on the 
time elapsed since that particular event took place. While our work aimed for analytical 
rather than statistical generalizability, further work is needed to establish the transferability of 
our single case study findings to different organisational contexts and industries. Replicating 
our study in developing country or commercial contexts would clearly expand our insights. 
Furthermore, studies in relation to the involvement of the diverse stakeholders in the disaster 
management context such as beneficiaries, the public, media, military and governments for 
building resilience could provide additional important insights.  
The richness of the data from the extreme case analysed here indicates the benefits 
from future studies adopting this approach. As expressed by Bamberger and Pratt (2010, p. 
665) ‘we should remind ourselves that some of the most significant contributions to 
management theory emerged from what might best be labeled “unconventional” 
organisational research’. For some critical but complex aspects of organisational activity, 
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particularly supply chain resilience as our initial step shows, such approaches may yield rich 
insights. (Francis, 2008; Naim et al., 2000) 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
1. General Information 
• Career, educational background, work experience (commercial or not for profit) 
• Current department and role, job description 
• Responsibilities, role in relation to organisation 
2. Role of SCM 
• Where do you see SCM in the organisation in relation to importance and recognition? 
• Can you tell me how your position is related to daily supply chain activities? 
o Typical supply chain 
o Routine operations 
o Role of IT 
o Role of partnerships/ collaboration, time frame 
3. Disaster Management 
• Please recall a specific example of a disaster in this region (before and after VOAD) 
o Slow onset vs. fast onset 
o Preparation, Immediate Response, Recovery 
o Organisation’s role and involvement 
• Can you think of an example where from your perspective many things went wrong? 
• How did you learn from it to make sure it won’t happen again? 
• Did it impact sustainability of operations? How? 
4. VOAD 
• Can you tell me about the establishment of VOAD EL Paso? 
• What processes and procedures do you have in place? 
• How do you prepare and mitigate risks and possible disasters? 
o Contingency planning / Mitigation 
o Techniques 
o Parties involved 
• How do you collaborate? 
5. If money wasn’t an issue would there be anything you would like to improve in your 
supply network?
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Appendix B 
Table 1 Supply Chain Resilience Overview (Adapted from Pettit et al. (2010)) – Support for System Level Resilience Approach 
System Level Resilience Capabilities Resilience Elements 
Christopher 
and Peck 
(2004) 
Rice and 
Caniato 
(2003) 
Sheffi 
(2005), 
Sheffi and 
Rice 
(2005) 
Blackhurst 
et al. (2005) 
Tang 
(2006) 
Ponomarov 
and 
Holcomb 
(2009) 
Supply Chain (re-)engineering:  X X X X X X 
The conceptualisation, design, implementation, 
operation and re-engineering of the supply chain 
(Naim et al., 2000) 
Efficiency: The ability to produce outputs with minimum 
resource requirements (Pettit et al., 2010). 
X  X X X X 
Redundancy: Limiting or mitigating the negative 
consequences of change by keeping resources in reserve, 
such as having safety stock, maintaining multiple supplier 
and running operations at a low capacity utilization rates 
(Blackhurst et al., 2005; Sheffi and Rice, 2005). 
X X X  X X 
Robustness: The ability of a supply chain to resist change 
without adapting its initial stable configuration (Wieland 
and Wallenburg, 2012). 
   X X  
Collaboration:  X X X X X X 
The level of joined decision making & working 
together at a tactical, operational or strategic 
level between two or more supply chain member 
(horizontal or vertical). Scalable through the 
magnitude of relationship strength, quality & 
closeness. (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011) 
Visibility: The identity, location and status of entities 
transiting the supply chain, captured in timely messages 
about events, along with the planned and actual dates/times 
for these events (Francis, 2008). 
X X X X X X 
Agility (Flexibility):  X X X X X X 
The ability to rapidly respond to change by 
adapting its initial stable configuration (Wieland 
and Wallenburg, 2012). 
Velocity: The speed in which a supply chain can react to 
changes in demand, upwards or downwards (Christopher 
and Peck, 2004).  
X X X X X X 
Visibility: see above X X X X X X 
Risk Awareness:  
Making supply chain risk assessment a formal 
part of the decision making process at every level 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004). 
 X  X X  X 
Knowledge Management:  
Knowledge and understanding of supply chains 
structures- both physical & informational and its 
ability to learn from changes (Adapted from 
Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009).  
 X X X X X X 
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System Level Resilience Capabilities Resilience Elements 
Pettit et al. 
(2010, 
2013) 
Zsidisin 
and 
Wagner 
(2010) 
Jüttner 
and 
Maklan 
(2011) 
Blackhurst 
et al. (2011) 
Ponis 
(2012) 
Wieland 
and 
Wallenburg 
(2012, 
2013) 
Supply Chain (re-)engineering:  X   X   
The conceptualisation, design, implementation, 
operation and re-engineering of the supply chain 
(Naim et al., 2000) 
Efficiency: The ability to produce outputs with minimum 
resource requirements (Pettit et al., 2010). X   X   
Redundancy: Limiting or mitigating the negative 
consequences of change by keeping resources in reserve, 
such as having safety stock, maintaining multiple supplier 
and running operations at a low capacity utilization rates 
(Blackhurst et al., 2005; Sheffi and Rice, 2005). 
X X  X X  
Robustness: The ability of a supply chain to resist change 
without adapting its initial stable configuration (Wieland 
and Wallenburg, 2012). 
     X 
Collaboration:  X X X X X X 
The level of joined decision making & working 
together at a tactical, operational or strategic 
level between two or more supply chain member 
(horizontal or vertical). Scalable through the 
magnitude of relationship strength, quality & 
closeness. (Jüttner and Maklan, 2011) 
Visibility: The identity, location and status of entities 
transiting the supply chain, captured in timely messages 
about events, along with the planned and actual dates/times 
for these events (Francis, 2008). X  X X X X 
Agility (Flexibility):  X X X  X X 
The ability to rapidly respond to change by 
adapting its initial stable configuration (Wieland 
and Wallenburg, 2012). 
Velocity: The speed in which a supply chain can react to 
changes in demand, upwards or downwards (Christopher 
and Peck, 2004).  
X X X X X X 
Visibility: see above X  X X X X 
Risk Awareness:  
Making supply chain risk assessment a formal 
part of the decision making process at every level 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004). 
 
X   X   
Knowledge Management:  
Knowledge and understanding of supply chains 
structures- both physical & informational and its 
ability to learn from changes (Adapted from 
Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009).  
 
X   X X  
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Table 3 Progression of Coding I (excerpt) 
 
Second Order Categories First Order Codes 
Disaster Management 
Processes 
Representative Data  
Immediate Response 
 
 
Implement response plan, 
measurements and metrics 
“A response plan  includes effective leadership, a resource centre and communication 
hub.” (Document 8) 
"CERT went out to shut off the electricity. So that others can continue to do their primary 
job, which is staying and assisting in the event of large emergency situation." (Volunteer 
1) 
 
"We got, maybe 12hours notice and we were ready. We were ready within 3 hours." 
(Functional Manager 1) 
"During our ice storm in February we had a shelter open at the Convention Centre, we 
were told that there were 100s if not 1000s of people coming." (Director 1) 
Evaluate direction and 
control 
 
"We responded quickly, we made sure that they had water and a place to stay and verified 
that the damaged really was only bad to 2 or 3 homes." (Functional Manager 2) 
"The critical step is called disaster assessment. During the flooding we had helicopters 
going out, city vehicles going around looking to see how many roof tops were sticking up 
out of the water." (Director 1) 
Evaluate communication "Collaboration with the Chamber of Commerce to activate more resources." (Director 1) 
“Partners with government emergency management agencies to facilitate communication 
and coordination.”(Document 9) 
Evaluate supply chain 
disruption outreach 
"We responded quickly, we made sure that they had water and a place to stay and verified 
that the damaged really was only bad to 2 or 3 homes." (Functional Manager 2) 
 
“Many houses developed black mold which can have serious health problems. In trying to 
assist residents with housing, appliances, clothing and food agencies working with flood 
victims often had to call multiple agencies to find what they needed.”(Document 3) 
Recovery  
 
Review and implement 
recovery plan 
 
"We formed a recovery comity. We said ok remember when we were planning? Now it 
has happened, now we need to take care of these residence." (Director 3) 
Ensure continuity of risk 
and resilience management 
“Three months after the floods agencies are still identifying and responding to long term 
needs of flood victims such as repairs to houses, mental health issues, and replacement of 
household goods.” (Document 3) 
 
"We said we need to bring people together and we worked with FEMA representatives 
and we all came together and said 'What can we do to help people that are not going to be 
able to fix their houses?'. So we worked together for about 3 years." (Director 3) 
Maintain employee support “The group developed by-laws, elected officers and established committees to solicit 
donations, coordinate volunteers, determine client needs, and coordinate case 
management.” (Document 3) 
Resume Operations "We had lists of resources that we could provide for them. We send out referrals for them: 
these are 3 different companies that are handing out what you need." (Volunteer 2) 
 
"We were providing cleaning items, personal care items, blankets. And then saying 'ok, 
now that you have all your necessities, your basic necessities, what else do you need." 
(Functional Manager 3) 
 
"They give them the referrals they need to other agencies who will help them on a longer 
term basis with e.g. new furniture, refer to." (Functional Manager 4) 
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Table 4 Progression of Coding II (excerpt) 
 
Second Order Categories First Order Codes 
Resilience Capabilities  Representative Data  
Supply Chain  
(Re-)engineering 
 
 
“Identify what agencies store furniture, equipment, appliances, food and clothing. Identify 
capacity to storing additional materials.” (Document 5) 
 
"Memorandums of understanding for supplies with commercial business.” (Director 1) 
 
"Set up of supplies in strategic locations." (Director 1) 
 
"We plan, we do strategic planning and training. It involves evacuation, sheltering, we have 
plans in place and people to respond in situations like that.” (Functional Manager 1) 
“A key part of the program is to reach the underserved areas and populations.” (Document4) 
"They give them the referrals they need to other agencies who will help them on a longer term 
basis with e.g. new furniture, refer to." (Functional Manager 4) 
“A response plan  includes effective leadership, a resource centre and communication hub.” 
(Document 8) 
Agility  
 
"We got, maybe 12hours notice and we were ready. We were ready within 3 hours." 
(Functional Manager 1) 
 
"During our ice storm in February we had a shelter open at the Convention Centre, we were 
told that there were 100s if not 1000s of people coming." (Director 1) 
 
"The critical step is called disaster assessment. During the flooding we had helicopters going 
out, city vehicles going around looking to see how many roof tops were sticking up out of the 
water." (Director 1) 
 
"We responded quickly, we made sure that they had water and a place to stay and verified that 
the damaged really was only bad to 2 or 3 homes." (Functional Manager 2) 
 
"We had to set up in a matter of hours to expect what we thought might be 5, 6, 7000 people. 
They were evacuating about 20000." (Director 2) 
Knowledge 
Management 
 
 
"Learning from passed events." (Director 2) 
 
"We plan, we do strategic planning and training. It involves evacuation, sheltering, we have 
plans in place and people to respond in situations like that.” (Functional Manager 1) 
 
"Practice plans in place." (Volunteer 1) 
 
"The way we prepare for disasters is that we keep up our skills." (Functional Manager 1) 
 
"In the event of an emergency situation it is very apparent that people want to step up and 
help. Unfortunately we can't have them do that unless they are trained." (Functional Manager 
2) 
 
"We do community education: get an emergency kit, make a plan, be informed." (Director 1) 
 
"The 20h course training teaches fire safety, life search and rescue, we teach them some 
medical operations, how to handle a mass medical operations, like how to get the most people 
out of a disaster emergency situation and save as many people as they possibly can and then 
we teach cribbing, which is cribbing is how to remove a victim off from a heavy object and 
then we teach them disaster psychology, terrorism." (Functional Manager 3) 
 
"It is a local take care of yourself, prepare yourself, assist yourself, be able to shut of your 
water, your electricity, your gas etc. Also take care of your neighbours, assist your neighbours 
and then in the event of a larger scale you go out and assist the community." (Functional 
Manager 3) 
 
"We do what we call dry runs, we do practices, e.g. what if a pipe line bursts.” (Functional 
Manager 1) 
“To provide assistance to businesses, non-profits and institutions in developing their own 
disaster plan.” (Document 5) 
"We need more liaisons to interface with other agencies that we work with, do training, make 
sure that we practice our plans.” (Director 2) 
"We said we need to bring people together and we worked with FEMA representatives and we 
all came together and said 'What can we do to help people that are not going to be able to fix 
their houses?'. So we worked together for about 3 years." (Director 3) 
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Table 6 Integrated Resilience Framework applied to Hurricane Katrina (based on information supplied by American Society of 
Civil Engineers, 2007; Brand and Seidman, 2009; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006; Holguin-
Veras et al., 2007; Qamar et al., 2007) 
Phase/ 
Process 
Situation in relation to Katrina 
Supply Chain Resilience Capabilities 
Horizontal & 
Vertical 
Collaboration 
Supply Chain  
(Re-) 
engineering 
Agility Risk 
Awareness 
Knowledge 
Management 
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
 
Establish a (cross-functional) 
planning team 
Absence of defined responsibilities and lack of 
leadership - Delays in aid response due to official lack 
of understanding of problems 
 X   X 
Analyse supply chain capabilities and 
hazards 
Absence of risk assessment - New Orleans’s hurricane 
protection system had never been quantified  X   X X 
Develop and communicate plan for 
preparedness, response & recovery 
Haphazard and underdeveloped plans– plans for New 
Orleans were still in the development phases and 
internally inconsistent 
   √  
Agree measurements and metrics for 
preparedness, response & recovery 
Inadequate metrics and measurements available due to 
underdeveloped plans – only some measures were 
available that were not implemented 
X X  X X 
Develop continuous improvement & 
supply chain risk mitigation plans 
Failure to address identified problem areas - it was 
known that FEMA (1) lacked staff and (2) its logistics 
system suffered from significant and long-standing 
problems. 
 X  √  
P
r
e
p
a
r
e
d
n
e
s
s
 
Implement preparedness plan: 
Translate strategic agreements into 
operational matters 
Poor implementation of plans and commitments – 
absence of transport for people without cars  X    
Evaluate based on measurements and 
metrics 
Inadequate evaluation - only initial pre-positioning of 
supplies, supplies were not enough      
Establish routines through training 
and simulation 
Unidentified constraints in achieving responsiveness – 
funding delays, last minute cutbacks, long approval 
processes for simulation exercise  unfamiliar 
processes and policies hampering response 
 X    
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Phase/ 
Process 
Situation in relation to Katrina 
Supply Chain Resilience Capabilities 
Horizontal & 
Vertical 
Collaboration 
Supply Chain  
(Re-) 
engineering 
Agility Risk 
Awareness 
Knowledge 
Management  
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
Implement response plan, 
measurements and metrics 
Failure in execution of response plans - Orders, 
requests and efforts were duplicated, left unfilled, 
unchecked or misdirected 
 X X   
Evaluate direction and control Inadequate continuous assessment - Adequate supplies 
were not received until 12 days after landfall; 
inadequate staff resourcing 
    X 
Evaluate communications throughout 
the supply chain 
Failure to communicate resource availabilities - 
delayed state and federal officials’ learning about 
where rescues were slowed shipments of food and 
water 
  X   
Evaluate supply chain disruption 
outreach 
Misjudgement of local impact of disaster - 
inappropriate aid distribution points that could not be 
reached by everyone 
 X X   
R
e
c
o
v
e
r
y
 
Review and implement recovery 
plans 
Recovery plans were established but not thought 
through - ineffective policies & systems to deliver 
services and resources across neighbourhood 
boundaries 
     
Ensure continuity of risk and 
resilience management 
Continuity of problems from response - poor 
communication and responsiveness, especially between 
City Hall and neighbourhoods; Strategic and 
coordinated planning and investment has been absent. 
   √  
Maintain employee support Constant support - Today different volunteer groups & 
FEMA are still helping residences to recover √   √  
Resume operations Delays, slow rebuilding - 3 years after the storm, many 
aspects of New Orleans’ recovery have not improved 
since the immediate aftermath of Katrina 
 X    
    X = not existent = Problems √ = Adequate 
